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Forecasting Significant Air Act
Implementation Issues: Permitting and
Enforcement
DANIEL RiESEL*

I. Introduction
The Clean Air Act (CAA)' was the original or flagship
statute of the 1970 environmental revolution. 2 All environmental statutes subsequent and prior to the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA)P are closely based on the 1970 CAA pattern.
Thus, this statute is the template for command and control
environmental legislation. The Clean Air Act Amendments
(CAAA), 4 passed in 1990, represent the culmination of almost
twenty years of regulatory work with that statute, and is perhaps the most prolix environmental legislation produced by
Congress. The bill was over 700 pages; Title III dealing with
toxic air pollutants was 122 pages alone, perhaps longer than
the 1970 legislation.
The CAA's implementation issues are numerous. Controls of toxic emissions, SO 2 , and ozone precursors
predominate. Regulations will expand to include larger numbers of smaller sources. There is a potential for personal
*

Sive, Paget & Riesel, P.C., New York City, specializing in environmen-

tal law and litigation. Mr. Riesel is a Lector of Law at Columbia University
School of law and author of several publications including ENvmomi.NTAL EN.
FORCEmENT, CrviL AND Cmz~uNAL (1996). He is a graduate of Union College and
the Columbia University School of Law.
1. See Clean Air Act (CAA) §§ 101-618, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1994).
2. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat.
1676 (1970).

3. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) §§ 101-405, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
4. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (CAAA), Pub. L. No. 101-549,
104 Stat. 2399 (1990) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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lifestyles and choices to be affected. Comprehensive permitting programs and self-monitoring programs will make compliance with emission requirements easier to police and
enforce, both by government and private enforcers. Midwestern and neighboring coal-fired power plants will implement significant S0 2 controls. Automobile users will experience higher prices for more controlled vehicles, more
comprehensive and widespread emissions testing, and government specification of fuels. Although this is a far reaching
environmental initiative, the Amendments hardly touch on
the greatest air pollution issue facing the world today, global
warming.5 Indeed, some of their strategies, for example, alternative fuels for automobiles, may add to global warming
6
gases.
Many of the provisions of the 1990 CAAA have been accepted without public controversy. For example, many commentators have indicated that the single most significant
new program of the 1990 CAAA is the acid rain reduction program, yet even that provision has generated little controversy
even though it was designed to reduce emissions of sulphur
oxides from electrical generating facilities by fifty percent.
Similarly, the stratospheric ozone protection program, the
goal of which is the total phase-out of certain chloroflorocarbons (CFCs), has been fairly uncontroversial.
With the exception of the electric vehicle requirement,
the section of the 1990 CAAA that deals with the Motor Vehicle program, which is intended to push auto manufacturers to
new levels of pollution control, has been remarkably uncontroversial. State Reasonably Available Control Technology
(RACT) requirements, designed to make major reductions in
nitrogen oxides from a variety of existing sources, have encountered little opposition.
However, other programs have proven to be highly controversial and have encountered significant resistance. New
5. See James Gerstenzang, Administration Backs Off Global Warming
Deadline Treaty: New ProposalSoftens Emissions Rules and Retreats from Ac-

tivist Stance Taken by Clinton 2 Weeks Ago, L.A. Tums, Dec. 7, 1996, at A8.
6. See WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JI., 1 ENVIRONMENTAL LAWv: Am AND WATER
§ 3.1C(B) (Supp. 1996).
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requirements for permitting and monitoring appear to remain stalled in the regulatory process. Attempts to revise
regulations covering new source review, and to adopt interim
emission control rules for "hazardous emissions" pending promulgation of Maximum Available Control Technology
(MACT) standards under section 112(d) of the CAA, 7 are all
fraught with controversy at the administrative level. There
has also been a public outcry over the reformulated gasoline
program, enhanced inspection and maintenance (I&M), and
"employee commuter options" designed to reduce the impact
of automobile travel on regional air conditions. The critical
issue in understanding what programs have met opposition
and what programs will continue to encounter resistance at
the regulatory level and in Congress is that the latter list of
programs intrudes into the manner in which individuals and
businesses conduct their affairs.
This Article examines that phenomenon in the context of
the new legislation's increased provisions for enforcement. In
this regard, enforcement goes far beyond the increased penalty provisions, and includes the CAAA's provisions for a federal permit system with increased monitoring and reporting
requirements. These statutory provisions are driving administrative activity which should soon result in the promulgation of far reaching regulations in their final form.
A.

Illustration of Indirect Sources of Air Contamination

This breakpoint can be seen in the history of the CAA.
An example of this form of marked resistance to implementing State Implementation Plans (SIPs) to achieve clean air
may be seen in the history of the indirect source of air contamination regulatory programs of the early 1970s. At that
time, the United States Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) required states to incorporate in their SIPs a program
for regulating, and to some extent, permitting new sources of
indirect air contamination. Those sources were identified as
parking lots, parking garages, highway links, airports, shop7. See CAA § 112(d)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2).
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ping centers, and other facilities that would attract idling
automobiles, a high source of carbon monoxide pollution.
This was viewed by the states and in Congress with considerable horror. Nevertheless, the EPA persisted, and many
states adopted indirect air source regulations. Indeed, New
York still has the remnants of that program, but it is restricted to below 60th Street in Manhattan. However, the uproar had a significant effect. The uproar was generated
because states and some segments of the public believed that
indirect air source regulations were an unwarranted and
harsh intrusion upon the traditional police power of the state
to regulate land use. Initially, the EPA reacted to this uproar
by rescinding its requirement that all SIPs contain indirect
air source regulations. It then required states that had been
so unfortunate as to promulgate those regulations to keep
them intact. Thereafter, Congress introduced a rider that
prevented the EPA from enforcing indirect air source regulations and, finally, a rider that eliminated the EPA's ability to
require indirect air source regulations.
The question then is, will the clearly intrusive Title V
regulations eventually meet a similar fate due to a lack of
enforcement will, administrative indirection, or outright legislative repeal?
B.

Balancing Perceptions

To some extent, the answer to this question lies in the
public perception of the impact of dirty air upon individual
health. There are really two issues: the perceived direct individual impact, and the perception as to who has to pay for the
environmental amenity. For there to be a consistent demand
for more regulation depends on the extent to which Americans perceive the health risks associated with dirty air and
the extent to which they believe corporate America will pick
up the cost.
To realize what America must have been prior to the implementation of regulatory programs, one need only travel to
some of our neighboring countries in South America to see
the horrific effect of unregulated air contamination. Re-
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cently, fishing in Patagonia, I departed Chile through its capital, the architecturally beautiful city of Santiago. There, the
air is so foul that one is afraid to breathe or even open one's
eyes on some days.
With its more advanced air standards, the United States
has made tremendous progress since the implementation of
the 1970 regulations. For example:
(1) emissions of toxic lead have dropped 98%;
(2) emissions of sulphur dioxide (S02 have dropped 30%,
despite industrial growth;
(3) emissions of carbon monoxide have dropped 24%, even
though driving has more than doubled;
(4) toxic emissions have been reduced by 1.6 billion
pounds per year since 1990;
(5) production of chemicals that deplete the stratospheric
ozone layer has been reduced by over 90% since 1990;
(6) in just five years more than half of the areas that violated the ozone, carbon monoxide, and small particulate standards now meet those standards; and
(7) cars burn their fuels substantially cleaner.8
Nevertheless, there is a fair amount of public opinion
saying that there is still a long road to be traveled. Last summer, it was reported that health-based air quality standards
were violated hundreds of times in dozens of states from California to Maine.
The American Lung Association believes that the healthbased standard is at a level that is far too lax to protect public
health adequately.9 It has suggested that the annual death
toll from polluted air in America is comparable to that of auto
accidents. More recently, the American Lung Association reported that an estimated 161 million Americans are potentially exposed to dangerous levels of ozone;' 0 that exposure
8. See generally, Gregg Easterbrook, The Environment: Ignore All Doomsayers on EPA Laws, LA Tims, Dec. 1, 1996, at MI.

9. See A
(1995).

NEC
LUNG

AsSOcIATioN, AIR POLLUTION: PROTECTING YOUR-

SELF

10. See Air Pollution: Cost/Benefit Analysis Not Needed to Set HealthBased Ozone Standards,Panel Told, Daily Env't. Rep. (BNA) (Nov. 14, 1995).

5

134

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14

includes nearly 100 million people who live in areas that are
now legally considered to be attainment areas. According to
the Natural Resources Defense Council, "more people die prematurely every year from heart and lung diseases associated
with airborne particulate matter than from car accidents." 1"
II. 1970 Expectations Unfulfilled
Congress's 1970 enactment of the paradigm of command
and control legislation, the CAA, delegated broad powers to
the EPA to promulgate regulations that would implement the
generalized objectives of the statute. That authority was reaffirmed in the 1977 amendments to the CAA. 12 The courts
have recognized this broad grant of rulemaking authority,
and the need to defer to the EPA's expertise. 13 Nevertheless,
the EPA has been cautious and, many critics would say, far
too conservative in both its administration and rulemaking
under the CAA. Indeed, the practitioner is quite often confronted with an absence of clear binding authority.
Practitioners have seldom been confronted with federal
and state enforcement actions brought pursuant to the CAA
or its regulations, or any state regulatory scheme. Indeed,
given the CAA's overreaching reach, the paucity of enforcement actions, as compared to those under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) 14 or the Clean Water Act
(CWA), 15 is quite pronounced.
A. Lack of Enforcement Tools
A fundamental philosophy under the command and control statutes of the last two decades has been that there
should be an even-handed and credible threat of enforcement.
11. See Particulates Cause More Premature Deaths than Car Accidents,
NIRDC Report States, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 90, at D-9 (May 9, 1996).
12. See H.R. REP. No. 95-294, at 1 (1977), reprintedin 1977 U.S.C.CA.N.
1077.
13. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984).
14. See Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) §§ 1002-11012,42
U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1994).
15. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act [Clean Water Act] (CWA)
§§ 101-607, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
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Hence, the various statutes have all embraced multiple enforcement mechanisms, including what some commentators
would consider fairly draconian criminal procedures.
As part of that philosophy, Congress required that delegation under those programs be preceded by a demonstration
of state authority to enforce the state programs to the same
extent that the federal government might in similar, but
nondelegated, circumstances.
The CWA has generally been regarded as a success, due
in a fair degree to its enforcement mechanism - including the
permitting of specific "point sources," self-monitoring, and
self-reporting. Neither the 1970, nor any of the other pre1990 CAA amendments contained such enforcement provisions. The absence of these provisions under the air regime
was readily apparent by a perusal of reported decisions in
cases of air enforcement and citizen suits brought against
emitters of air contamination. The enforcement cases are so
few as to be virtually nonexistent when compared with the
plethora of actions brought under the CWA.
B. Limited Number of Citizen Suits
The number of citizen suits brought under the CWA directly against polluters is large. Indeed, at certain times in
our recent history there have been more than 200 cases at a
time pending in the district courts. If the citizens suits
brought to compel the Administrator of the EPA to carry out
nondiscretionary duties such that the promulgation of regulations were eliminated, the number of CAA citizen suits could
probably be counted on the fingers of both hands. The reason
for this discrepancy is not that emitters of air pollution have
been more scrupulous than wastewater dischargers, but because of the difficulty of enforcing against sources of air contamination without also having specific standards and
effective self-monitoring and reporting.
Congress noted that "[tihe failure of the current Act to
require operating permits puts it at odds with the other major environmental statutes."16 Congress also linked the fed16. S. REP. No. 101-228, at 346 (1989).
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eral permit system with the issue of enforcement by saying
that "[in order to assure adequate compliance with the Act,
there needs to be a Federal Operating Permit requirement as
provided by the title [Title V]." 17 Clearly, as a matter of Con-

gressional intent, the foundation of the newly enhanced air
enforcement system is the permit system. As a practical matter, the complex and diverse air programs will not achieve
their goals unless they can be reduced to readily enforceable
permits.
III. The Permit Program and Enforcement
Perhaps one of the most intrusive aspects of the CAAA
will be the combination of the Title V permitting program
with the enhanced enforcement bowers. Today, the average
industrial facility has not yet dealt with the full impact of
these combined aspects of the 1990 CAAA. Few lawyers have
been consulted by industrial clients to help fashion permits.
However, my survey of engineering consultants indicates
that they have been routinely submitting Title V permit applications. One particularly active consultant, Rob Finlayson
of Eder Associates, has described the immediate impact on
small industrial facilities to be a relatively modest, one time
only, application cost of $15,000 to $25,000.
Problems may develop when applications uncover previously unpermitted sources, but Title V has not yet had an intrusive impact on industry. Accordingly, controversy has
focused on certain procedural aspects of the program.
Permits are required for all "major sources" in a system
similar to the CWA's National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) program. The CAA provides: "[ilt
shall be unlawful for any person to violate any requirement of
a permit issued under this title, or to operate an affected
source..., [or] a major source.., except in compliance with a
permit .

.-".1"

Operating permits were not previously re-

quired, but were used in thirty-five states, including New
York. The EPA developed a draft permit regulation which
17. Id. at 347.
18. CAA § 502(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7661a (1994).
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identifies the statutory, regulatory, and program elements
that a state must implement to become the permit issuing
authority. States must, within three years, submit programs
for approval by the EPA, otherwise the EPA must implement
its own plan.
The 1990 CAAA added Title V, a new title requiring the
creation of a state-administered permit program.' 9 Under
the permit program, operating permits are required for most
20
significant sources of regulated emissions.
Prior to the 1990 CAAA, the CAA only required individual federal permits for new or modified sources. Existing
sources were regulated at the federal level by general requirements contained in SIPs, new source performance standards (NSPS), or national emission standards for hazardous
air pollutants (NESHAP) regulations.
Under Title V of the CAA, the EPA has promulgated
rules that define state operating permit programs and the
standards and procedures by which the EPA can approve,
oversee, and withdraw approval of state operating permit
2
programs. '
Permits are required for several sources, including all
stationary sources defined as "major sources" under various
provisions of the CAA.22 Sources subject to the permit program include the following:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

"major sources;"
"affected sources" as defined in Title IV (acid rain);
new modified sources subject to CAA § 111 NSPS;
air toxics sources regulated under CAA § 112;
sources required to have new source or modification
permits under parts C or D of Title I; and
(6) other sources designated by the EPA regulations.
For example, under Title I, a source that emits more
than 100 tons per year of regulated pollutants is considered a
19. See id. §§ 501-507, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661-7661f.
20. See id. § 502, 42 U.S.C. § 7661a.
21. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 70 (1995).

22. See CAA § 502(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(a).
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major source. Moreover, smaller sources may be considered
major sources in certain non-attainment areas. The amended
version of section 112 of the CAA defines a major source as
any source that emits or has the potential to emit more than
ten tons per year of any individual hazardous pollutant, or
more than twenty-five tons per year of any combination of
hazardous pollutants. 23 Thus, permits will be required for
many sources that did not need permits before the 1990
CAAA.
A. Enhanced Enforcement Mechanisms
The new, or perhaps forthcoming, regulation of hazardous air pollutants (HAPs), and the increased concern over the
impact of air pollutants generally, will be translated into definitive Title V permit requirements. This increased and
more pervasive regulatory requirement must be viewed in
the context of enhanced enforcement civil and criminal powers under section 113 of the CAA, the imposition of monitoring and "compliance certificates" requirements under section
114, the imposition of penalties through citizen suits under
section 304, and a $10,000 qui tam provision under section
113(f).
B.

State Implementation

The new permit program is to be administered primarily
at the state level. The CAA required the EPA to promulgate
regulations by November 1991, establishing the minimum elements to be included in each state's permit program. 24 In
addition, section 502(d) required each state to submit a permit program by November 1993.25 If the EPA approves of

part of a program, it is authorized to grant interim approval
to the remainder of the program until the necessary revisions
are complete. The EPA is also authorized to veto state permits not in compliance with the CAA.26 Where a program
23.
24.
25.
26.

See id. § 112(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1).
See id. § 502(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b).
See id. § 502(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(d).
See id. §§ 502-505, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7661a-b, 7661d.
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substantially, but not fully, meets the requirements of Part
70, the EPA is authorized to grant the program interim approval for a period of up to two years. If the EPA has not fully
approved a program by two years after November 15, 1993, or
by the end of an interim program, it must establish and implement a federal program. On April 27, 1995, the EPA published a proposed federal operating permit program. Under
the rule as proposed, the EPA is the permitting authority in
areas not having approved programs. Under the rule, the
EPA may delegate implementing authority to affected states.
The final federal program was targeted for May 1996.
Within one year after the EPA approves a state's permit
program, the sources subject to permitting requirements
must submit permit applications, including plans for compliance. 27 The states are required to provide for public comment
and hearings on permit applications and must act on initial
applications within three years. 28 Due to the quantity of initial permit applications, state processing of the initial applications is expected to take several years. Section 502(b)
requires permittees to pay an annual fee to the state agency
administering the program. Significantly, for the first time,
the Title V program provides that the federal and state air
pollution control requirements be incorporated into a single,
consolidated permit. The owner of the facility must then certify that it is in compliance with the requirements of the
permit.
C. Regulations and Guidance
In July 1992, the EPA issued regulations outlining the
requirements which state and local agencies must meet in
formulating their operating permit programs. 2 9 Environmental groups, industry, and states immediately sued the EPA
over some of those provisions. The main area of controversy
involved the process for revising permits - not the procedures
for the issuance of permits. Industry concerns included the
27. See CAA § 503(b), (c), 42 U.S.C. § 7661b(b), (c).
28. See id.
29. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 70.
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delays caused by the revision process. Although the litigants
reached no final settlement in August 1994, the EPA issued a
proposed rule describing a new permit revision procedure
that attempted to accommodate the litigants' varying concerns. The proposal, however, was criticized as being more
complicated and burdensome than the first proposal.
After discussions with a group of stakeholders, the EPA
agreed with many of the criticisms of the proposed rule. It
then committed to the issuance of a supplemental proposed
rule to streamline the permit revision process. The EPA issued the supplemental proposed rule on August 31, 1995.30
The proposed rule received ninety-five comments. The final
rule had a target date for September 1996.
Simultaneously, various sources had begun to submit
their permit applications. As this occurred, the EPA became
aware of the burdens and costs associated with preparing
permit applications. The EPA found that some of the information being requested in the permit applications exceeded
federal requirements. Accordingly, on July 10, 1995, the EPA
issued White Paper No. 131 to enable industry and agencies to
take steps to reduce the cost and size of permit applications.
White Paper No. 1 gives guidance to states by encouraging
the use of:
(1) emissions descriptions, not estimates, for emissions
not regulated at the source;
(2) checklists, rather than emissions descriptions, for insignificant activities;
(3) exclusions for trivial and short-term activities; and
(4) "batch" or generalized treatment of certain activities
(for example, space heaters) subject to certain generally applicable requirements.32

30. See Operating Permits Program and Federal Operating Permits Program, 60 Fed. Reg. 45,530 (1995) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 70 and 71).
31. OFFICE OF AiR QuALrry PLANNING AND STANDARDS, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, WHITE PAPER FOR STREAMLINED DEVELOPMENT OF

PART 70 PERMIT APPLICATIONS (1995) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER No. 1].
32. See WHITE PAPER No. 1 at 5-9, Attachment A.
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On March 5, 1996, the EPA issued White Paper No. 233
to streamline and simplify the permit program requirements.
D.

Industry Impact

Industry has been affected by Title V in several ways.
For example, companies have discovered new uncontrolled
emission points or air pollution requirements that apply to
them, but of which they were previously unaware. Also, by
identifying all the requirements with which a facility must
comply in one document, permits potentially will avoid unnecessary controversy as to whether a given requirement applies to that facility. This consolidation of requirements
benefits industry by avoiding the need for costly litigation to
resolve such controversies.
The supplemental proposal of August 31, 1995 includes a
simplified system for permit revisions. It gives states flexibility to decide the amount of public review for the majority of
permit revisions by matching the level of review to the environmental significance of the change. A state is not required
to provide review for changes that it can show to be de
minimis.
The supplemental proposal states that the EPA will restrict its veto of permit revisions to only the most environmentally significant changes. The proposal includes a waiver
of the EPA's veto of less environmentally significant changes,
which constitute the majority of changes at facilities, for a
five-year period during which the EPA will review how well
state programs are working. The EPA rules envision that
businesses will only need to go through a single significantly
streamlined permit revision process at the state level.
As it is being developed by the EPA, the permit program
also offers benefits to industry by providing a vehicle for flexibility through fashioning permits that either create plantwide caps (with an overall emission limit and record keeping,
33. See OFFICE OF Am QUALrY PLANNING AND STANDARDS, U.S. ENVIRONM1ENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, WHITE PAPER NUMBER 2 FOR IMPROVED IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PART 70 OPERATING PERmrT PROGRAm (1996) [hereinafter WmTrE

PAPER No. 2].

13

142

PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14

including alternate operating scenarios) or provide advance
approval of new units or modifications (for example, getting
permit approval that includes a future source of emissions).
This kind of permit design can potentially save substantial
time and money over the previous system, in which many
process changes had to be individually approved through
lengthy changes to SIPs.
By consolidating all federal requirements in one document, facilities have the ability to use the permit mechanism
to accomplish goals not achievable in the past. The operating
permit program also may facilitate implementation of market-based trading programs by encouraging facilities to use
trading as a means of compliance and eliminating the need
for sources to process time-consuming amendments to their
SIPs in order to make a trade.
The EPA has received programs from approximately
fifty-six state and territorial agencies and sixty local agencies. The EPA has published approval notices for thirty-five
state programs and has formally proposed approval for
twelve more.3 4 The EPA has also approved fifty-three local
permitting programs and proposed approval for six more. 35
The EPA published a disapproval notice for only one state
(Virginia).36
E.

Hazardous Air Pollutants (HAPs)

The CAA authorizes the EPA to establish health-based
NESHAPs. Since 1970, the EPA has listed only eight hazardous air pollutants and has established standards for only
seven. The 1990 CAAA direct the EPA to establish technology-based standards for 189 hazardous substances based on
the use of MACT.
The 1990 CAAA completely revise section 112, establishing a list of 189 regulated hazardous air pollutants.3 7 The
34. See generally, Approval Status of State and Local Operating Permits
Programs, 40 C.F.R. pt. 70 app. A (1997).
35. See generally id.
36. See Fourth CircuitSummary, 20 Wmf. & MARY ENVTL. L. & PoLicy REa.
445 (1996).

37. See CAA § 112(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1).
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EPA is required to establish standards for major sources,
which are defined as those with the potential to emit ten tons
per year of any hazardous pollutant or twenty-five tons of any
combination of pollutants. These sources must meet emission limits based on the use of MACT.
The principal elements of the 1990 CAAA were:
(1) inclusion in the statute of
a long list of hazardous sub38
stances to be regulated;
(2) creation of a strict timetable for the promulgation of
regulations governing emissions of those
substances; 3 9

(3)

a new technology-based methodology for regulating
hazardous emissions, with the principal focus on maximum control of total source emissions rather than on
40
strict pollutant-by-pollutant emission standards;
and
(4) a revised strategy for regulating "residual risk."4 1

Under section 112, "major" sources include sources with
much lower levels of emissions than the "major" sources regulated under most other provisions of the CAA. 42 In addition,

a source may be a major source based on aggregate emissions
of several pollutants, even if emissions of each individual pollutant are relatively small.
Once the EPA has identified and listed major and area
source categories of hazardous emissions, it is required to
promulgate regulations establishing "emission standards" for
each source category. Such standards need not be uniform
for all sources within the category; the EPA may "distinguish
among classes, types, and sizes of sources .... ."4 However,
all such standards must be based on the application of
MACT.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

See id. § 112(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1).
See id. § 112(e), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(e).
See id. § 112(d)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2).
See id. §§ 112(f), 129(h)(3), 42 U.S.C §§ 7412(f), 7429(h)(3).
See CAA § 112(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a).
Id § 112(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(1).
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The CAA requires emission standards to reflect the maximum degree of reduction in emissions that the EPA determines to be achievable, taking into account "the cost of
achieving such emission reduction, and any non-air quality
health and environmental impacts and energy requirements
.... "44 Emissions standards will be considered achievable if
they can be achieved through such measures as changes in
processes or materials; the use of closed systems; measures to
collect, capture, or treat pollutants; changes in design, equipment, work practice, or operational requirements; or any
combination of the above.
For a new source, MACT may not be less stringent than
the level of control that is actually achieved in practice by the
best controlled similar source. For existing sources, MACT
may be no less stringent than the average level of control
achieved by the "best performing" twelve percent of existing
sources in the category (excluding those that have been required within the past thirty months preceding promulgation
to comply with the lowest achievable emission rate). If a
source category includes fewer than thirty sources, MACT
must at least equal 'the average emission limitation achieved
by the best performing five sources ...."45

Once the EPA has promulgated MACT standards
for a
source category, those standards will apply to all major
sources that have operations falling within that category.
Since the "source categories" for which the EPA is to promulgate MACT standards will be defined based on particular
types of operations rather than on complete facilities, some
facilities may face separate MACT requirements for different
operations. Moreover, when classified as a "major source," a
facility may be required to adopt MACT controls for point
sources that, standing alone, would not be major sources. In
most cases, the new MACT regulations will establish the
most stringent requirements applicable to a source.
The requirements created under section 112 are to be incorporated in operating permits issued pursuant to Title V of
44. Id. § 111(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1).
45. Id. § 112(d)(3)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(3)(B).
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the CAA. If the EPA fails to promulgate standards for a
source category by the deadline established in section 112(e),
permits for sources in that category must state requirements
that are "equivalent to the limitation that would apply to
such source if an emission standard had been promulgated in
a timely manner... "46 If the EPA thereafter promulgates
its own standard, that standard must be incorporated in the
permit either upon issuance (if promulgation occurs before
the permit is finally issued) or upon its renewal (ifthe permit
has already been issued).
Of all the provisions of the 1990 CAAA, the section dealing with emissions of hazardous substances is the most far
reaching, both in terms of the number of sources that will be
affected and in the extremely stringent character of the new
controls. Within the next ten years, virtually all mediumand large-sized sources of hazardous pollutants will be required to control emissions (often for the first time) and to
adopt control measures that, in many cases, will push the
bounds of economic feasibility: the tiny sources and leaks
that, standing alone, are of little significance, but taken together can account for an appreciable portion of a facility's
total emissions.
Once source categories have been established, an important process with which a facility should become involved, it
will be necessary to participate in the process through which
the EPA establishes MACT requirements for each category.
Although the statute establishes a floor for MACT, the EPA
may consider more stringent requirements. Regulated
sources should be involved so that they can provide their own
input on these issues.
F. The Potential-to-Emit Controversy
The major source concept has been expanded by the concept of bringing within Title V's scope a facility's potential to
46. Id. § 112(j)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(j)(5). See also Alabama Power Co. v.
Costle, 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1980), for a detailed discussion on the definition
of potential to emit.
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emit as opposed to its actual emission. This claimed expansion of Title V's reach is subject to considerable controversy.
The term "potential to emit" means the maximum aggregate capacity of an operational source or of a facility to emit
an air contaminant under its physical and operational design. 47 A source's potential to emit can only be restricted by a
federally enforceable emission limit.48 This concept raises
many compliance issues for various sources of air pollutants.
For instance, grandfathered 49 and unpermitted sources
whose emissions do not meet such limits will be considered to
be operating at maximum design capacity in order to determine whether the facility is a major source. In addition, fugitive emissions will be included in the calculation of a facility's
potential to emit. Grandfathered sources will be burdensome
to the facilities that have continued to operate them in order
to avoid complying with the existing air permit program.
Those facilities whose actual emissions are below the "major
source" threshold may either want to stop utilizing their
grandfathered or unpermitted equipment, or to submit permit applications under the existing program, in order to establish federally enforceable emission limits.
Furthermore, since even minor modifications may trigger
a full permit review process, permits need to be drafted with
the future in mind. Affected facilities must draft permits that
serve the facility's existing needs while allowing enough flexibility to meet future business requirements. To the extent
that companies have not begun their planning process, the
permit program is a long and costly experience that requires
extensive planning in order to avoid future complications.
IV. Enhanced Self Monitoring and Reporting
A permit without an efficient mechanism to insure compliance is not much of a regulatory tool. The major implementation issues relating to Title V do not appear to be the
47. See 40 C.F.R § 52.21(b)(4) (1996).
48. See id.
49. Sources in existence before the start-up of permit programs in certain
states.
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processing of the permit application. A strong environmental
consulting industry appears to have this problem well in
hand. However, the maturing of environmental enforcement
generally, and the provisions of the CAA now being implemented for monitoring and self reporting or compliance certification, appear to be critical aspects of implementation for
stationary sources. Accordingly, Congress amended the CAA
to revise Title VII, the federal enforcement program. 50
The 1990 CAAA contain several provisions directing the
EPA to require owners or operators to conduct monitoring of
emissions and to make compliance certifications. These provisions are set forth in both the Title V (operating permits
provisions) and the Title VII (enforcement provisions) of the
1990 CAAA.
Title V directs the EPA to implement monitoring and
compliance certification requirements through the operating
permits program. Section 503(b)(2) requires, at least, annual
certifications of compliance with permit requirements and
prompt reporting of deviations from permit requirements. 5 '
Section 504(a) mandates that owners or operators submit to
the permitting authority the results of any required monitoring at least every six months.5 2 This section also requires
permits to include "such other conditions as are necessary to
assure compliance with applicable requirements" of the
CAA.53 Under section 504(c), each operating permit must

"set forth inspection, entry, monitoring, compliance certification, and reporting requirements to assure compliance with
the permit terms and conditions." 54
Title VII of the 1990 CAAA added a new section 114(a)(3)
that requires the EPA to promulgate rules on enhanced monitoring and compliance certifications. This paragraph provides, in part:
50. Compare CAA § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 7413, with CAA 8§ 501-507,42 U.S.C.
§8 7661a-7661f.
51.
52.
53.
54.

See CAA § 503(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7661b(b)(2).
See id. § 504(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7661c(a).
Id,
Id. § 504(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7661c(c).
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The Administrator shall in the case of any person which is
the owner or operator of a major stationary source, and
may, in the case of any other person, require enhanced
monitoring and submission of compliance certifications.
Compliance certifications shall include (A) identification of
the applicable requirement that is the basis of the certification, (B) the method used for determining the compliance
status of the source, (C)the compliance status, (D) whether
compliance is continuous or intermittent, (E) such other
facts as the Administrator may require.55
The 1990 CAAA also revised CAA section 114(a)(1) to
provide additional authority concerning monitoring, reporting, and record keeping requirements. 56 As amended, that
section provides the Administrator of the EPA the authority
to require any owner or operator of a source, on a one-time,
periodic or continuous basis to:
(A) establish and maintain such records;
(B) make such reports;
(C) install, use, and maintain such monitoring
equipment;
(D) sample such emissions (in accordance with such intervals, during such periods and in such manner as
the Administrator shall prescribe);
(E) keep records on control equipment parameters, production variables, or other indirect data, when direct
monitoring of emissions is impractical;
(F) submit compliance certifications in accordance with
section 114(a)(3); and
(G) provide such other information as the Administrator
may reasonably require. 57
Taken together, the statutory provisions prescribe a set
of measures that owners or operators must follow in order to
provide an assurance of ongoing compliance with the CAA.
It is impractica in most situations of conducting compliance method tests frequently enough to determine continuous
55. Id. § 114(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(3).
56. See CAA § 114(a)(1)(A)-(G), 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(1)(A)-(G).
57. Id.
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compliance. Instead, the EPA has considered the option of
relying on monitoring requirements as a means of determining whether compliance is continuous or intermittent.
A.

Compliance Assurance Monitoring (CAM)

The CAM proposal would focus on situations where existing requirements fail to assure ongoing compliance with
emission limitations or standards under the CAA. One
means of assuring compliance is to require the use of a monitoring method that determines continuous compliance. This
type of approach may be a result of an underlying applicable
requirement. It may also apply as a result of the exercise of
other authority by the EPA or the permitting authority, such
as through an enforcement action, or by the election of an
owner or operator in some situations. In any of these circumstances, the CAM proposal generally would direct the owner
or operator to use that monitoring to fulfill its monitoring and
compliance certification requirements as allowed under Part
70.58

B.

Compliance Assurance Monitoring Rule

In October 1993, the EPA proposed the enhanced monitoring program, including both new regulations and amendments to several existing air pollution program regulations. 59
The program required owners or operators of both major stationary sources of non-hazardous air pollutants and of
sources subject to existing national emissions standards for
hazardous air pollutants to perform enhanced monitoring of
air pollution at significant emissions units.6 0 The proposed
rule required that enhanced monitoring data be used to determine the compliance status of affected emissions units
with certain applicable emission limitations or standards.6 1
58. See supra note 21.
59. See Enhanced Monitoring Program, 58 Fed. Reg. 54648 (1993).

60. See id.
61. See id.
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The proposed rule contained criteria and procedures that
owners or operators must follow for enhanced monitoring. 62
Proposed reporting and record keeping requirements would
identify the basis, content, frequency, and other requirements for enhanced monitoring reports. Enhanced monitoring data would be used to certify compliance pursuant to 40
C.F.R. Part 7063 to fulfill requirements of enhanced monitoring. The enhanced monitoring program may also be implemented through preconstruction permits issued under the
CAA.
Industry groups and others strongly criticized the proposed rule on the basis of increasing rule stringency, excess
burden on state and local agencies to evaluate monitoring
plans, and the detrimental effect on the developing operating
permit programs.
In April 1995, the EPA withdrew the Part 64 enhanced
monitoring rule to allow for further review of monitoring approaches. It received an extension of the court-ordered deadline until July 1, 1996, to allow time for stakeholder
involvement in the development of a new rule.
The redrafted rule, CAM, is designed to satisfy the requirements for monitoring and compliance certification in Titles V and VII of the 1990 CAAA. The goal is to improve
compliance with the CAA so that emission reductions will be
achieved and the need for other control regulations can be
reduced.
Since April 1995, the EPA has held several major stakeholders' meetings, various focused follow-up forums with
stakeholders, and numerous conference calls and other communications concerning the rule structure, applicability, and
timing. A major stakeholders' meeting was held on September 22, 1995, following distribution of the draft CAM rule for
public comment. The reproposal date for CAM was scheduled
for December 1995, and the promulgation date was scheduled
for June 30, 1996. The reproposal date was delayed until
62. See id.
63. See supra note 21.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol14/iss1/15

22

1996]

PERMITTING AND ENFORCEMENT

151

July 1, 1996, and the promulgation date was targeted for approximately six months later.
The draft CAM proposal establishes: (1) the criteria that
define what monitoring should be conducted by a source to
provide a reasonable assurance of compliance with emissions
limitations and standards, including how frequently determinations of compliance must be made in order to certify compliance with emissions limitations or standards; (2) the
maximum number of discrepancies within acceptable control
performance; and (3) the time period acceptable for completing corrective actions indicated by the monitoring results.
The draft CAM proposal addresses all regulatory requirements for monitoring and testing under Title V and Title VII. The periodic compliance determination requirements
in the CAM proposal specify criteria for establishing a schedule of compliance determinations for purposes of certifying
the compliance under Part 70. The draft proposal also
reduces the scope of the current Part 70 program by not requiring monitoring or testing of third tier units, as is currently required under the "gap-filling" periodic monitoring
requirements in Part 70.
Under the old draft CAM proposal, a certification of compliance by the owner or operator requiring an emission limitation or standard involved two steps. First, the owner or
operator would certify compliance directly with the emission
limitation or standard based on the results of applying the
method specified in the Part 70 permit as the means for determining and certifying compliance with that emission limitation or standard. Second, the owner or operator would have
to certify compliance with the associated monitoring, reporting, and record keeping requirements in the permit which
provide an assurance of ongoing compliance with the emission limitation or standard.
Section 504(b) permits the Administrator of the EPA to
promulgate appropriate test methods and monitoring requirements for determining compliance. 64 That section
states that "continuous emissions monitoring need not be re64. See CAA § 504(b), 42 U.S.C. 7661c(b).
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quired if alternative methods are available that provide sufficiently reliable and timely information for determining
compliance." 65 Because this section directly refers to promulgating monitoring requirements for determining compliance,
the proposal cites this section, in addition to section 114(a)(3),
as explicit authority for the proposed regulations.
Section 504(a) states that permits shall include "a requirement that the permittee submit to the permitting authority, no less often than every six months, the results of any
required monitoring, and such other conditions as are necessary to assure compliance with applicable requirements of
the Act."66 Section 503(b)(2) states that permitted sources
must certify compliance with any applicable permit requirements "no less frequently than annually ... and promptly
report any deviation from permit requirements to the permitting authority."67
V. Credible Evidence Rule
The 1990 CAAA also revised CAA section 113 to clarify
what evidence may be used to prove violations of the CAA.68
Section 113(e), as amended, provides that "the duration" of a
violation may be established "by any credible evidence (including evidence other than the applicable test method)." 69
In April 1995, the EPA decided to reevaluate this rule
and proposed a draft CAM rule. The CAM rule is designed to
satisfy the requirements for monitoring and compliance certification in section 114(a)(3) of the CAA7o and the compliance
requirements under CAA § 503(b).71 The EPA's stated goal is
to improve compliance so that emission reductions will be
achieved and the need for other control regulations will be
reduced. The proposed rule is targeted for July 1, 1996 and
the final rule should be promulgated within one year of that
65. Id.
66. Id. § 504(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7661c(a).
67. Id. § 503(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7661b(b)(2).
68. See id. § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 7413.

69. CAA § 113(e), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e).
70. See id. § 114(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(3).
71. See id. § 503(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7661b(b).
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date. Essentially, the CAM rule establishes criteria that define what types of monitoring should be conducted by a particular source, in order to provide reasonable assurance of
compliance with emission limitations and standards.
One of the most controversial aspects of the 1993
rulemaking proposal involves the use of data collected in accordance with the CAM rule (and through other methods) to
be used as "credible evidence" in federal enforcement proceedings. The EPA proposed to amend 40 C.F.R. Parts 51, 52,
60, and 61 to eliminate exclusive reliance on reference test
methods as the means of demonstrating compliance with
emissions limits and to clarify that credible evidence can be
used for compliance determinations.
Industry is highly concerned about the potential use of
all emissions data as credible evidence for both compliance
assurance and enforcement proceedings. If the CAM rule
adopts the use of a credible evidence rule, a potentially large
quantity of emissions data, which may show violations stemming from the natural viability of daily operations, could trigger costly federal enforcement measures.
The crux of the credible evidence issue is that many
stakeholders believe that credible evidence should not be
used to determine liability for a violation without a formal
rulemaking process. Section 113(e)(1) of the CAA provides
that, in assessing penalties for violations, the government
can consider, inter alia, "the duration of the violation as established by any credible evidence (including evidence other
than the applicable test method)." 72 Many stakeholders have
argued that credible evidence is addressed only with regard
to penalties but without regard to actual liability. Thus, this
provision should not be bootstrapped to provide an evidentiary standard for liability.
A proposed amendment to 40 C.F.R. Parts 51, 52, 60, and
61 to add the use of credible evidence generally for all source
categories is arguably illegal because the CAA does not provide any authority for this evidentiary standard. In addition,
industry has argued that the EPA cannot change the regula72. Id. § 113(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e)(1).
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tions to allow the use of credible evidence without source-category by source-category rulemaking. For example, in the
various subparts of Part 60, source categories have Continuous Emissions Monitoring Systems (CEMS) requirements for
operation and maintenance measures.73 The modification to
include the use of credible evidence generally would enable
the government to use such CEM data to determine compliance, rather than merely using performance test or reference
test data. Stakeholders assert that the EPA must follow formal rulemaking procedures for each source category to establish the credible evidence standard.
Nevertheless, through the 1990 CAAA, the EPA intended
to put teeth in the CAA's enforcement mechanism by promulgating a new rule on credible evidence. The comment period
on the proposed Credible Evidence Rule ended on May 2,
1996, and a final rule, making it easier to refer and prove
violations of the CAA, is expected by September 1996.74 In
the likely event that the proposed Credible Evidence Rule is
promulgated by a final rulemaking, the regulated community
would suffer more of a bite from the 1990 CAAA.
The proposed regulation would do away with the argument that noncompliance of a stationary source could only be
proven by use of standard "reference tests" set forth in the
Code of Federal Regulations, 7 5 which have been long relied
on by the regulated community. The Credible Evidence Rule
would provide that the EPA, a state, or a citizen suit'litigant
may use routine monitoring, opacity tests, emissions trading
data, engineering calculations, or any other "credible evidence" to prove violations of permits, the CAA, and SIPs. The
only limitations on proof of a violation would be the applicable federal and state rules of evidence. The rule, when coupled with the 1990 CAAA's beefed-up enforcement
mechanisms, -such as mandatory CEMS, has the potential for
dramatically increasing enforcement actions.
73. See 40 C.F.R 60.

74. See Transcriptof April 2, 1996 CredibleEvidence StakeholdersMeeting
[hereinafter, Stakeholder Meeting Transcript].
75. See 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 60, and 61 (1995).
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Members of the regulated community have expressed
their concern to the EPA that the Credible Evidence Rule
would, in effect, do away with accepted emissions standards
and expose them to numerous unfounded public and private
enforcement actions. 76 Their concern is that any departure
allowing the use of a regulated party's own reports to prove
CAA violations will open the door to greatly increased numbers of citizen suits, as was the experience under the CWA.
To place this concern in context, stationary sources of air
contamination have been allowed to demonstrate compliance
with permits and SIP requirements by performing standardized engineering tests on a prescribed, infrequent basis, often
annually. 77 As the EPA put it, "[o]ver the past twenty years
the Agency has published a number of 'reference test methods' and, in order to assure uniformity in the application of
emissions standards, has required sources to establish compliance with emissions standards by use of those reference
test methods." 78 Accordingly, stationary sources have
demonstrated compliance with CAA requirements by structuring their facilities to pass the infrequent but technically
exacting standard reference tests specified in the regulations.
The EPA proposal may relegate these reference tests to the
status of any other credible evidence, such as continuous
emission monitoring data, production records, or any other
probative and evidentiary competent data. The EPA defends
this change by arguing that it was Congress that changed the
rules by providing for "enhanced monitoring" compliance certification and reporting by enacting the 1990 CAAA. 79
Members of the regulated community should not ignore
the prospect of new regulatory enforcement through the use
of the Credible Evidence Rule and are advised to pay close
attention to it. There can be no doubt that the EPA plans to
76. See The Use of Information Other Reference Test Results for Determining Compliance with the Clean Air Act, EPA White Paper, Mar. 22, 1996, at 2
[hereinafter, EPA Compliance Paper].
77. See Enhanced Monitoring Program, 58 Fed. Reg. 54648, 54658 (1993)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 60, 61 and 64).
78. EPA CompliancePaper,supra note 76, at 1.
79. See CAA §§ 113-14, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7413-14.
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promulgate the rule as quickly as possible, and use it to enforce compliance in situations that historically have been
overlooked. In its Compliance White Paper, the EPA stated
that it "is now considering proceeding to final promulgation of
previously proposed revisions of 40 C.F.R. Parts 51, 52, 60
and 61, to revise regulatory provisions that have been read as
requiring exclusive reliance on reference test methods as the
means of determining compliance with emissions limits."80
Robert Van Heuvelen, Director of the EPA's Office of
Regulatory Enforcement, repeated the statement at the April
2, 1996 stakeholders' meeting, and added that one purpose of
the proposed rule was "to clarify that credible evidence can be
used for compliance determinations." 81
The regulated community's concern is that compliance
will no longer be defined by the standard reference tests,
which make the realistic assumption that the pollution control equipment or procedures will not be able to achieve these
standards one hundred percent of the time due to the numerous variables arising from day-to-day operations.8 2 Thus, the
vast quantity of emissions data may reflect normal deviations
from the enforcement standards due to operational variations
and other unavoidable causes, which under the application of
the Credible Evidence Rule may nevertheless be used to
prove violations. Accordingly, the regulated community's argument is that to meet the reference test emission standard
one hundred percent of the time, a more stringent standard
would have to be imposed upon stationary sources than is actually provided for in those tests.
The EPA has sought to mollify the regulated community
with assurances of "common sense" and a "balanced enforcement program" that would eschew judicial enforcement in the
case of minor violations. The agency has stated that its "approach to minor unexcused violations generally has been to
exercise prosecutorial discretion [and] where appropriate, to
take no enforcement action at all. EPA does not intend to use
80. EPA Compliance Paper,supra note 76, at 1.
81. Id.
82. See id.
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,,83

Even if the EPA's assurance were to be taken as a binding promise, the problem that would be created by the Credible Evidence Rule can be seen in the 1995 citizen suit
litigation entitled Sierra Club v. Public Service Company of
Colorado.8 4 In that suit, the Sierra Club was successful in
proving almost 20,000 opacity violations by relying on reports
drawn from the defendant's CEMS, despite the defendant's
arguments that the applicable regulations provided that compliance must be demonstrated by the standard test known as
the "Method Nine" procedure for visual observation. The district court relied, in part, upon the 1990 CAAA's legislative
history, which included a Senate Report noting: "[tihe
amendment clarifies that courts may consider any evidence of
violation or compliance admissible under the Federal Rules of
Evidence, and they are not limited to consideration of evidence that is based solely on the applicable test method in the
state implementation [plan] or regulation."85 Subsequent to
the district court's finding on liability, the EPA notified the
6
utility of several thousand new violations.
The proposed elimination of the defense that stationary
source operators may demonstrate CAA compliance by meeting reference tests raises the specter of dramatically increased CAA enforcement because of the beefed-up command
and control structure that Congress wrote into the 1990
CAAA. Congress adopted the successful enforcement mechanism of the CWA as a model for CAA enforcement. 87 The
principal CWA enforcement mechanism goes beyond permitting; it is both the requirement for self-monitoring through
periodic wastewater sampling and the filing of Discharge
Monitoring Reports (DMRs) reflecting those test results.8 8 In
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

EPA Compliance Paper at 1.
894 F. Supp. 1455 (D.Colo. 1995)
Id. at 1461 (quoting S. REP. No. 101-228, at 366 (1989)).
See Inside EPA's Clean Air Report, Feb. 8, 1996, at 14.
See generally CWA § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1994).
See 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(l)(4)(i) (1996).
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1990, Congress transferred this paradigm of command and
control legislation to the CAA's Title V, its new permitting
section, and, perhaps more importantly, to a new section 114,
which provides: "[t]he Administrator shall in the case of any
person which is the owner or operator of a major stationary
source, and may, in the case of any other person, require enhanced monitoring and submission of compliance
certifications."8 9
Originally, the EPA attempted to implement these aspects of the 1990 CAAA by seeking to promulgate the Credible Evidence Rule as part of its ill-fated proposed Enhanced
Monitoring Rule. That rule met such an onslaught of criticism that it was eventually withdrawn, only to emerge again
as a proposed CAM Rule.90 As originally proposed, the Credible Evidence Rule would have amended the reference test
regulations to eliminate language that has been interpreted
to provide for exclusive reliance on reference test methods as
a means for establishing compliance. The draft CAM rule,
circulated in September 1995, omitted any reference to "credible evidence." The EPA's present plans are to promulgate a
"final" Credible Evidence Rule in September 1996 and,
shortly thereafter, to publish its new CAM rule.91
Where the EPA has feared to tread, states have rushed
in with their own versions of the Credible Evidence Rule. It
is reported that at least twelve states are in the process of
amending their SIPs to include a Credible Evidence Rule. 92
So far, the EPA appears to have promulgated final rules approving amended SIPs in four states, incorporating the "any
credible evidence" concept. The states are Iowa, 93 Kansas, 94
89. CAA § 114(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(3) (emphasis added).
90. See Enhanced Monitoring Program, 58 Fed.Reg. 54648,54658 (1993) (to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 60, 61 and 64) (withdrawn in April 1995.
The EPA has circulated a "draft" CAM rule, and its publication is anticipated
sometime in the fall of 1996).
91. See Inside EPA's Clean Air Report, Vol. VII, No. 8 at p. 24 (April 18,
1996).
92. See INSUDE EPA WEEKLY REPORT, States Rush Ahead to Adopt Controversial Tools to Enforce Air Act, May 10, 1996 at 3.
93. See Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; State of Iowa,
60 Fed. Reg. 32,601, 32,602 (1995) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52).
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South Dakota, 95 and Missouri. 96 In each case, the states
were responding to an EPA demand to offer such an amendment based upon the EPA's assertion of the authority of the
proposed, but withdrawn, Enhanced Monitoring Program of
1993.
The EPA is correct that it is doing Congress' bidding in
establishing enhanced monitoring and in reminding the regulated community that section 113(a) of the CAA allows an enforcement action to be commenced on the basis of any
information available to the Administrator of the EPA. There
are, however, both legal and engineering problems that militate against "any credible evidence" becoming tantamount to
proof equal to reference test compliance. Congress only provided that credible evidence may be taken into consideration
to prove the "duration of the violation," as opposed to establishing the violation. 97 In fact, at one point, the EPA itself
explicitly accepted the principle that "any credible evidence"
should be used subsequent to finding liability, but only to establish the duration of a violation for penalty purposes. 98
The engineering problems with using miscellaneous data to
establish emissions violations also militates against the proposed expansion of the use of the "any credible evidence" lan94. See Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans and Section
112(1) Program for the issuance of Federally Enforceable State Operating Permits; State of Kansas, 60 Fed. Reg. 36,361-62 (1995)(to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 52).
95. See Clean Air Act Approval and Promulgation of State Implementation
Plan for South Dakota; Revisions to the Air Pollution Control Program, 60 Fed.
Reg. 46,222, 46,225 (1995)(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52).
96. See Approval and Promulgation of Implementation; State of Missouri,
61 Fed. Reg. 4,352 (1996) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52).
97. CAA § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 7413.
(e) Penalty Assessment Criteria
(1) In determining the amount of any penalty to be assessed... the
Administrator or the Court... shall take into consideration...
the duration of the violation as established by any credible evidence (including evidence other than the applicable test
method) ....
Id. § 113(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e)(1).
98. See Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of State Implementation
Plans, Methods for Management of Condensible Particulate Emissions from
Stationary Sources, 56 Fed. Reg. 65,433 (1991)(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.

50).
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guage. The emissions standards set by the reference tests did
not contemplate achievement of those standards in one hundred percent of a facility's operations; the standards reflect
the performance of a pollution control device under average
conditions, and therefore anticipate some statistical variation
on a day-to-day basis.9 9 Furthermore, due to the inherent
limitations in the monitoring process, monitoring equipment
can be expected to produce variations that may not consistently reflect the accurate emission rates. 00
In its abandoned 1993 Enhanced Monitoring rulemaking
effort, the EPA presented two hypotheticals to illustrate how
the Credible Evidence Rule would work. One hypothetical illustrated how, if a CEMS had to be taken off-line for repairs,
the EPA could show a violation by presenting expert testimony that an emissions control system operating at a low
temperature would result in noncompliant emissions. In a
second hypothetical, the EPA suggested that the Credible Evidence Rule would allow it to present testimony that a monitoring system was faulty by not picking up noncompliant
emissions.' 0 '
Neither of the two hypotheticals presented by the EPA to
show how the Credible Evidence Rule would work, however,
they address the main concern of the regulated community.
That concern, simply stated, is that by relegating periodic
standard reference test methods to the status of any other
credible evidence and giving evidentiary weight to monitoring reports, the EPA is sharply tightening the standards for
compliance. The concern is that what may have been previously ignored as an occasional excursion between periodic
testings will now be the basis for one - or many - violations.

Hopefully, any new rule will take into account both the
statistical variations associated with standard reference tests
and the variable, less accurate nature of other procedures for
ascertaining emissions. Any absence of such tolerance in the
new rules will have significant impact on the regulated com99.
100.
101.
(1993),

See Stakeholder Meeting Transcript,supra note 74.
See id.
See Enhanced Monitoring Program, 58 Fed. Reg. 54,648, 54,676-67
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 60, 61 and 64).
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munity because the 1990 CAAA drastically increased the civil
and criminal enforcement provisions of the CAA, as well as
facilitating the bringing of citizen suits.1 0 2
A. Federal Enforcement
Title VII represents a substantial increase in civil enforcement authority and a significant increase in criminal authority. These increases include an increase in the maximum
civil penalty to $25,000 per day.20 3 It also allows field citations with penalties of up to $5,000 per day.' 0 4
The provision for administrative orders set forth in section 113(a)(1) allows the EPA to require "any person [that]
has violated or is in violation of any requirement or prohibition of an applicable implementation plan or permit" to come
into compliance. 105 This provision only provides for an opportunity to confer before the order's issuance. Section 113(a)(5)
prohibits construction or modification of any major stationary
source upon failure of state regulations.' 0 6 Section 113(b)
also provides for fines of $25,000 per day or injunctive relief
and administrative penalties of $25,000 per day, with a
$200,000 cap.' 0 7 Because of the new permit program, which
will be federally enforceable even if implemented by a state,
the requirements of the CAA will be much easier to enforce
by the EPA, the state, or citizens.
The 1990 CAAA essentially repeals the old, narrow criminal provisions by adopting what must be considered the most
aggressive package of federal environmental criminal provisions. Violations are felonies. Negligence is established as a
basis for criminal culpability when releases cause imminent
danger of death or serious bodily harm. Individual corporate
102. See e.g. CAA § 113(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c) (criminalizing many violations of the Act); CAA § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (eliminating the decision in
Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49 (1987)).
103. CAA § 113(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b).
104. Id. § 113(d)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d)(3).
105. Id. § 113(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(1).
106. See 1d. § 113(a)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(5).
107. See id. § 113(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b).
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officers are put at explicit risk and failure to pay a fee is also
a crime.
The citizen suit provision is greatly expanded by the
CAAA. The amendments essentially overrule the Supreme
Court's decision in Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation,
to allow citizens sue for violations solely in the past, with
very minor exceptions.' 0 8 Also, monies collected as penalties
no longer need to go to the United States Treasury.
The 1990 CAAA did not, however, change section 101(3)
of the CAA, in which Congress found "that air pollution prevention and air pollution control at its source is the primary
responsibility of States and local government." 10 9 Nor have
the political and programmatic constraints on the EPA to
leave states with the prime enforcement role been changed by
the 1990 CAAA.
However, the 1990 CAAA will greatly strengthen the
EPA's oversight and leadership role, at least through the decade it takes to implement the 1990 amendments fully. Under
the CAAA, the EPA will require states to increase their enforcement authority. Increased enforcement authority will
require state legislation, sometimes changes in regulations,
and probably increased state environmental staff. The degree of change required will be determined by the regulations
and policy guidance now being prepared.
The increased EPA enforcement authority may lead to an
increased threat to states and the regulated community of
"over-filing" by the EPA if the state enforcement action does
not meet the EPA's "timely and appropriate" test. There is
likely to be an increased emphasis by the EPA on cases with
larger state civil penalties closer to those generated by the
EPA's civil penalty policy. Thus, even when defending
against a state air enforcement action, lawyers are advised to
be wary of being too successful and to keep an eye on the EPA
penalty policy as one gauge of the potential for EPA overfiling.
108. See Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
109. CAA § 101(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3).
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Citizen Suits Under the CAA Are Likely to
Increase in Usage

The 1990 CAAA effectively reversed the principal holding of Gwaltney that, absent ongoing violations, the courts
lacked subject matter jurisdiction under citizen suit provisions like section 304 of the CAA before its amendment. 110
The 1990 CAAA would allow citizen suits for solely past violations ".... if there is evidence that the alleged violation is
repeated ... ."13 Presumably, this quoted language would

only protect against citizen suits for a single past violation of
12
one type; this does not afford much protection.
Equally, if not more importantly, the new permit programs will presumably require increased self-monitoring and
reporting, more like the reporting requirements of the
NPDES program under the CWA. There is a simultaneous
trend across the country toward continuous air monitoring,
where feasible, and it is becoming more feasible in many circumstances. The new permit program and the trend toward
continuous monitoring will make the task of proving a citizen's case significantly easier, which will make such suits
more common.
In Sierra Club, the court relied on CAA § 113(e), which
provides that in "determining the amount of any penalty to
be assessed under ... [slection 7604(a) of this title ...

the

court, as appropriate..., shall take into consideration.., the
duration of the violation as established by any credible evidence (including evidence other than the applicable method)
.*."..113

With regard to matters of evidence, the CAAA clari-

fies that courts may consider any evidence of violation or
compliance admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence,
without being limited to consideration of evidence that is
110. See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
111. See CAA § 304(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(1).
112. Note: This amendment goes into effect in actions brought two years or
more after the enactment of the 1990 Amendments but, because it applies to
actions, not violations, it would appear to reach back to violations that predated the enactment of the 1990 Amendments.
113. Sierra Club, 894 F. Supp. at 1461 (quoting CAA § 113(e), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7413(e)).
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based solely on the applicable test method in the state implementation or regulation. For example, courts may consider
evidence from CEMS, expert testimony, and bypassing and
malfunctioning control equipment, even if these are not the
EPA's applicable test methods. Thus, the CAAA overrule the
ruling in United States v. Kaiser Steel Corp.114 to the extent
that the court in that case excluded the consideration of such
evidence. 115
VIII.

Criminal Prosecutions, Heretofore a Relative

Rarity, Will Increase Markedly
Prior to the 1990 CAAA, the criminal provisions of the
CAA were quite limited. Many standards, and all permits,
were adopted at the state level. In turn, many, but not all of
these became part of the EPA-approved SIPs. 1 16 This entire
state regulatory structure was beyond federal criminal enforcement unless either the EPA first gave a violator 30-days
notice whereafter the violation continued, or the EPA took
over all enforcement in a recalcitrant state."I7 The only exceptions were some relatively unusual areas in which the
EPA could proceed directly to criminal charges.
As amended, the criminal provisions are mostly felonies
and now reach "any person who knowingly violates ... Section 502(a) or 503(c) of Title V (relating to permits) . .. ."s
The new permitting provisions in Title V of the 1990 CAAA
are modelled after the CWA's NPDES permit program.
Under the NPDES permit program, each state-issued permit
in an approved state is also a federal permit and its terms are
federally enforceable, both criminally and civilly. After the
permit requirements of the 1990 CAAA are implemented, the
resulting permits will be immediately criminally enforceable
at the federal level without the requirement of a 30-day notice period.
114. See United States v. Kaiser Steel Corporation, No. 82-2623-IH, 1984
WL 186690 (C.D.Cal. Jan. 17, 1984)
115. Cf. S. REP. No. 101-228, supra note 16.

116. See CAA § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 7410.
117. See id. § 113(c)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(5).
118. CAA § 113(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c).
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In addition to this most sweeping change, Congress enacted other extensions of the federal criminal enforcement
powers. The amendments twice make it a crime to knowingly
fail to pay any fee owed to the government under the CAA. It
is a felony under section 113(c)(1), as amended, and a misdemeanor under section 113(c)(3), as amended.1 19 This is a
novel way to collect a fee and is probably unparalleled elsewhere in environmental law.
Congress also followed earlier legislation in enacting
CAA sections 113(c)(4) and 113(c)(5), which establish two related crimes for emissions of H.APs, 120 the emission of which
"places another person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury". 121 Under section 113(c)(4) of this "endangerment" legislation, a negligent emission which is a
negligent endangerment is a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for up to one year. 122 Under section 113(c)(5), a
knowing release which is a knowing endangerment is a felony
punishable by imprisonment for up to fifteen years. 123 If an
"organization" is convicted under section 113(c)(5), it can be
punished by a fine of up to $1 million. 124 Second offenses are
subject to twice the maximum imprisonment and fine.' 2 5 All
this change is bound to lead to a flurry of lawyering for that
growing subspecialty of environmental criminal defense.
The potential reach of CAA sections 113(c)(4) and
113(c)(5) should be of concern to officers and managers of air
pollution sources. Much will depend on the Department of
Justice's and the courts' interpretation of the central phrase
"places another person in imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury" in amended section 133(c)(5)(F).12 6 Notice
that these subsections apply without regard to whether or not
119. See CAA § 113(c)(1), (3), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(1), (3).
120. See id. § 112, 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (defining Hazardous Air Pollutants
(HAPs)); see also CAA § 113, 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (federal enforcement procedures
for HAPs violations).
121. CAA § 113(c)(4), 42 U.S.C. 7413(c)(4).
122. See id.
123. See id. § 113(c)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(5).
124. See id,

125. See id. § 113(c)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(4).
126. CAA § 113(c)(5)(F), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(5)(F).
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the emission violates any standard or permit. Presumably, if
the substance released is a carcinogen, it would pass the test
for danger of death or serious bodily injury, and the subsection would apply but for the question of imminence. All exposures to carcinogens, no matter how small, are assumed
under current EPA risk assessment methodology to increase
the risk of cancer by some amount. However valid or invalid
that assumption may be (and many believe it to be invalid),
the analysis does assume a substantial latency period between exposure and resulting additional cancers. If the imminence test applies to death or serious bodily injury and not
to the mere danger of later death or serious bodily injury, the
application of these provisions will be restricted to spills of
tank cars, ruptures of pipes and the like, in which sudden,
relatively large-volume releases occur. If the imminence test
applies instead to the danger, rather than to the injury or
death itself - a strained, but possible reading - these subsec-

tions are potentially broadly applicable.
Informal conversations with lawyers in the Crimes Section of the Environment and Natural Resources Division of
the United States Department of Justice indicate that this
interpretive issue is unresolved. However, the United States
Department of Justice has argued that a present danger of
future cancer satisfies the imminence test of RCRA
§ 3008(e),127 the imminent danger provision of RCRA which
is identical to new CAA sections 113(c)(4) and 113(c)(5). 128
On an appeal from a conviction, the Tenth Circuit failed to
reach the issue of the future cancer risk because it sustained
the conviction on other grounds. 129 From the opinion, it appears that the future cancer risk theory was allowed as evidence and went to the jury. 130 If that approach continues
under the new criminal provisions of the CAA, those provisions could become substantial weapons in a prosecutor's arsenal. At least in the case of carcinogens, the use of those
127.
128.
1989).
129.
130.

See RCRA § 3008(e), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(e).
See United States v. Protex Industries, Inc., 874 F.2d 740 (10th Cir.
See id.
See id.
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subsections under such an interpretation would be unfettered
except by the prosecutor's good judgment, sometimes a weak
constraint. Regardless of the interpretation of the imminent
danger provisions, the expansion of section 113(c)(1) is great
131
enough, and the degree of scienter required low enough,
that there is sure to be a very substantial increase in federal,
and ultimately also state, criminal prosecutions of air
violations.
Impact of Permitting on Stationary Sources
It is clear that many industries will find themselves subject to increasing regulation due to the permit system. Detailed permit provisions will reduce the ability of many
facilities to vary operations that affect emissions. To do so
will often require plants to seek amendments to their operating permits. Even minor changes will require the plant to
give state agencies seven days notice of such changes.
I. Recent Dust-up Over. Enforcement/Audit Policy
The prospect of enhanced auditing is illustrated by the
recent "dust up" over state audit laws. Fifteen states have
enacted audit privilege laws which provide a privilege or
qualified privilege for environmental audits. 132 The EPA has
been informed by several environmental groups that it would
be sued if it approved Title V programs of states with such
audit privilege laws. The EPA considered withholding approval of Idaho's Title V program, but decided to review the
period) and apissue over the next two years (interim status
133
issue.
the
review
to
force
pointed a task
131. See e.g., United States v. Greer, 850 F.2d 1447 (11th Cir. 1988); United
States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Johnson & Towers,
741 F.2d 662 (3rd Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom., Angel v. United States, 469
U.S. 1208 (1985).
132. See generally Clean Air Act Final Interim Approval of Operating Permits Program, State of Idaho; Clean Air Act Proposed Delegation of National
Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants as They Apply to Title V
Sources and Approval of Streamlined Mechanism for Future Delegations, State
of Idaho, 61 Fed. Reg. 64622 (1996) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 70).
133. See generally id.
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Conclusion
Modern environmental regulation in America started
with command and control legislation of the 1970s. The 1990
CAAA is likely the most intrusive legislation of the environmental revolution. Prior attempts to regulate the environment, when they directly affect members of the public, were
tempered by subsequent legislation and administrative fiat.
However, the CAAA have emerged in an era of realistic public concern over ambient air quality. This public concern and
awareness, and the introduction of an effective enforcement
apparatus, should result in an increased sensitivity on the
part of the regulated community and a commitment to CAA
enforcement. A combination of factors will result in the increase in enforcement: a federally mandated permit system,
increased monitoring and reporting requirements, new citizen's suit provisions, and a stronger enforcement apparatus.
These factors will continue to focus attention on the permit
process, the resulting permit terms, and permit enforcement.
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